财务与金融系2019双周论坛

主 题：政府激励与财务信息中介行为：基于中国证券分析师的经验证据

主讲人: 何贤杰

协调人: 许年行

时 间：2019-04-10 10:00

地 点：明德商学楼1008室

语 言：中文

We study how sell-side analysts produce information in a context where the government can influence financial intermediaries. Leveraging seven economic periods between 2005 and 2015 when the government had strong incentives to prop up the stock market, we show that sell-side analysts employed at state-owned brokerages issued relatively optimistic earnings forecasts and stock recommendations during these periods. This relative optimism is particularly pronounced in earnings forecasts for larger firms and for state-owned enterprises, and is found regardless of analysts’ experience or star status, or of their brokerages’ degree of dependence on commissions. Although these optimistic forecasts are also relatively less accurate, the evidence suggests that they influence investors’ beliefs. These findings highlight the role of government incentives in the behavior and output of analysts in emerging-market contexts.