会计系学术讲座系列2021年第5讲

主 题：Executive Pay Restrictions, Political Promotion Incentives, and R&D Investments

主讲人: 郑登津（中央财经大学副教授）

协调人: 汝毅

时 间：2021-04-14 10:00

地 点：明商1008会议室

语 言：中文

讲座摘要:

Exploiting the 2014 pay restriction scheme for SOEs in China as a natural experiment, this study finds a significant decrease in the research and development (R&D) investment of SOEs compared with non-SOEs after the scheme. The effect of the scheme is attenuated in SOEs that have higher political ranks or offer more opportunities for political promotion. SOEs experience a decrease in executive pay-performance sensitivity, innovation quality, and firm value after the scheme. Overall, our findings suggest that restricting pay impedes corporate R&D investment by distorting incentives from compensation; however, political promotion incentive mitigates the negative impact of the scheme.

主讲人简介:

郑登津，中央财经大学会计学院副教授。2013年于中央财经大学获得学士学位，2017年于清华大学获得博士学位。主要研究领域为公司财务与公司治理、党组织与公司治理、股权质押等。学术成果已发表于Journal of Accounting and Public Policy、管理世界、金融研究、会计研究、南开管理评论等国内外重要期刊。主持国家自然科学基金青年项目1项和教育部人文社科青年基金项目1项。