会计系学术讲座系列2021年第9讲

主 题：Reporting Rules in Bank Runs

主讲人: 郑荣获 (德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校助理教授)

协调人: 汝毅

时 间：2021-05-12 10:00

地 点：Zoom会议室

语 言：中英文

地点：Zoom会议室

https://zoom.com.cn/j/65763014271?pwd=MFc5K1VUNi9ZeWxxUWt5VURHOFkvUT09 

会议ID：657 6301 4271

密码：664690

讲座摘要:

We study the role of reporting rules in the context of bank runs. In our model, a financial institution receives an early but imprecise estimate of the performance of its investment and issues a report subject to a reporting rule. We find that, from a financial-stability standpoint, the optimal reporting rule requires full disclosure when the financial institution's early estimate is sufficiently unfavorable, but no disclosure otherwise. Importantly, the threshold below which the financial institution reports should be tailored to the financial institution's exposure to bank-run risk. In particular, the optimal reporting threshold is non-monotonic and U-shaped in the bank-run risk. We also relate our results to current accounting standards for asset impairments.

主讲人简介:

Dr. Ronghuo Zheng is an Assistant Professor of Accounting at the McCombs School of Business at the University of Texas at Austin. He obtained his PhD from the Tepper School of Business at Carnegie Mellon University. His research interests are in the broader area of financial and managerial accounting with a focus on the role of information in decision making. His research has been published in the Journal of Accounting and Economics, the RAND Journal of Economics, Management Science, and INFORMS Journal on Computing.