管理科学与工程系学术讲座系列2022年第20讲

来源：管理科学与工程系

主 题: Behavior-Based Pricing in Congestion-Prone Systems

主讲人：王钟彬(天津大学管理与经济学部副教授)

时 间：2022年11月23日 (周三) 上午10:00

地 点：线上会议室

语 言：中/英文

讲座摘要：

Problem definition: Recent years have witnessed the widely use of data to recognize the repeat and new consumers so as to offer them with different prices, i.e., behavior-based pricing (BBP). Extant research has examined the impacts of BBP on the market, but most of which ignore the congestion effect in serving each consumer. This research extends the literature by investigating the effect of promised delay cost (PDC) on the firms and consumers to reveal the implications of BBP in congestion-prone systems. Methodology/results: We establish a two-period dynamic game-theoretic duopoly embedded with a queueing system, where a PDC that captures the service quality is committed to consumers before the start of sales season. Firms collect consumers' purchase history data in the first period and then conduct a BBP in the second period. We uncover that the heterogeneity of PDCs fundamentally affects the impacts of BBP. First, it indicates that BBP is always detrimental to the firm that provides a higher service quality. Second, contrary to the conventional wisdom that BBP always reduces social welfare because of the inefficient consumer switching in the second period, we reveal that, somewhat surprisingly, the overall social welfare can be improved by using BBP when the difference of PDCs is large. Finally, when the PDC is endogenously determined, we reveal that the practice of BBP lowers the service quality in the long run, but improves the payoffs of both firms. Managerial implications: We show that pay-to-switch strategy is not always favorable for the low-capacity firm, which should shift from pay-to-switch strategy to pay-to-stay strategy as the difference of PDCs increases. Further, BBP should be encouraged by the social planner when the difference of PDCs is large. With endogenous PDC, managers should be more cautious about using BBP when the marginal capacity cost or delay sensitivity is intermediate, where neither party can benefit from it.

主讲人简介：

王钟彬，现就职于天津大学管理与经济学部，担任英才副教授。主要研究方向为随机运筹学，排队经济学，以及平台经济下的供应链管理。主持国家自然科学基金项目1项，博士后项目1项，以主要参与人参与国家自然科学基金重点项目1项。以第一作者或通讯作者发表高水平论文10余篇，其中在运营管理类国际顶级刊物Operations Research, Management Science, Manufacturing and Service Operations Management，Production and Operations Management等发表多篇学术论文。曾获2021年美国运筹学与管理学研究协会(INFORMS)服务科学最佳论文奖第一名(并列)，2021年第十三届“行为运筹学与行为运营管理”研讨会青年教师优秀研究奖，第六届“系统科学与系统工程科学技术奖（优博奖）”以及2021年管理科学与工程学会“优秀博士学位论文奖励计划”。

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