主 题:Social Distancing: Two Extensions of the Standard Model(流行病风险与应对)
主讲人: Flavio Toxvaerd (剑桥大学经济系教授)
时 间:2021-06-22 18:00
地 点:Zoom会议室
语 言:英文
Zoom会议室:https://us05web.zoom.us/j/9743031538?pwd=TWFLMlN0SUJFN0ZZSE5Pc3F2YWQ1QT09
会议 ID: 974 303 1538
密码:20210622
摘要:
This paper presents an economic model of an epidemic in which susceptible individuals may engage in costly social distancing in order to avoid becoming infected. Infected individuals eventually recover and acquire immunity, thereby ceasing to be a source of infection to others. Under non-cooperative and forward-looking decision making, equilibrium social distancing arises endogenously around the peak of the epidemic, when disease prevalence reaches a critical threshold determined by preferences. Spontaneous, uncoordinated social distancing thus acts to flatten the curve of the epidemic by reducing peak prevalence. In equilibrium, social distancing stops once herd immunity sets in, but acts to extend the duration of the epidemic beyond the benchmark of a non-behavioral epidemiological model. Comparative statics with respect to the model parameters indicate that the curve becomes flatter (i) the more infectious the disease is and (ii) the more severe the health consequences of the disease are for the individuals.
报告人简介:
For many years, Professor Flavio Toxvaerd has been working, writing and speaking on the economics of infectious diseases, to both economists, public policy specialists and epidemiologists. He has conducted detailed studies on issues such as the optimal control of epidemics though vaccines, treatment and social distancing, the optimal control of diseases when infection is endemic and the optimal management of population immunity using vaccines and antivirals.He has also considered issues of individual incentives and decision making, and how to best align private incentives with public health goals. Lastly, he has worked on the issue of individual decision making when diseases are asymptomatic, with an emphasis on the effects of individuals’ beliefs, risk attitudes and propensity to fatalism.
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