财务与金融系学术讲座系列2021年第9讲

主 题：众筹中的信任：来自集资活动中的实验证据

主讲人: 杨珺（金融学教授，印第安纳大学凯莱商学院）

协调人: 李晨煦

时 间：2021-09-24 09:00

地 点：Zoom会议室

语 言：英文

地点： Zoom会议室

https://zoom.com.cn/j/87264818339?pwd=RGlqbC9nNmozQ1pRZFV3TS9qSE1KZz09

会议 ID：872 6481 8339

密码：177530

讲座摘要:

Despite the importance of trust on economic outcomes, little is known about the determinants of interpersonal trust. In this paper, we examine the role of trust and the types of characteristics that are associated with the perception of trustworthiness in the context of crowdfunding, using a randomized field experiment with the donors of a fund-raising campaign. The key feature of the campaign involves random rotation of various versions of the campaign page which differ in the profile photo, details of campaign description, and update status. These versions generate different levels of perceived trustworthiness, which are then independently judged by a pool of Amazon mTurk participants. We first find that while posting updates to the campaign significantly increases perceived trustworthiness and amount raised, showing a more detailed description has little impact. Interestingly, having a white male profile picture receives a higher trustworthiness score and generates a higher contribution level, which can be (partly) explained by white and male participants’ biases. Finally, we find that the above relationship disappears when the donors are directly connected to the founding team, highlighting the certification and trust-transmitting role of social networks.

主讲人简介:

Jun Yang is a Director of the Institute for Corporate Governance and Professor of Finance at Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. Her research focuses on corporate finance, corporate governance, executive compensation, and FinTech.

Jun’s work on opportunistic managerial behavior in compensation peer benchmarking practice was published by the Journal of Financial Economics (JFE) and Review of Financial Studies. Jun’s current research investigates opportunistic managerial behavior related to executive pensions and various factors that may affect the nature of director independence (e.g., collusive trading between independent directors and the CEO, and corporate charitable donations to independent-director-affiliated charities). Her most recent publication at the JFE shows that in some circumstances managers are able to extract rents through their pension plans. Top executives receive one-time increases in pensionable earnings through higher annual bonuses one year before a plan freeze and one year before retirement. Firms also boost pension payouts by lowering plan discount rates when top executives are eligible to retire with lump-sum benefit distributions.