主 题：Skill Acquisition and Information Sales（技能获取与信息销售）
We develop an information-sales model in which investors acquire costly skills to interpret the purchased data. Because both information and trading skills are limited resources, data providers and skilled investors share the gains generated from trading on the purchased information. Information quality is characterized by clarity and accuracy, both of which are controlled by the information seller. When the seller produces very precise information, she adds personalized noise to the sold data; when she produces imprecise information, she sells data “as is.” Our analysis shows that the asset management industry and the information industry tend to foster each other. Nonetheless, the development of both industries does not necessarily improve price in-formativeness. Finally, our analysis makes predictions about other important variables such as information accuracy and information prices.
Dr. Shiyang HUANG received his Ph.D. degree in finance from the London School of Economics in 2015 and subsequently joined the University of Hong Kong. He also holds a master degree and a bachelor degree in economics from Tsinghua University. His research interest focuses on financial economics and empirical asset pricing. His work has been published in the Journal of Financial Economics. He won the best paper awards at Paris December Finance Meeting 2014, China International Conference in Finance 2015, China Academy of Management Annual Meeting 2017 and Annual Conference in Financial Economics Research by Eagle Labs 2017.