主 题：The Externalities of Corruption: Evidence from Entrepreneurial Firms in China（腐败的外部性：中国创业企业的证据）
Exploiting the Chinese anti-corruption campaign as an exogenous shock to corruption, we show that following a decrease in corruption, the performance of firms in highly corrupt industries improves. Small firms appear to benefit to a larger extent. We identify the channels through which corruption hampers firm performance. Following the anti-corruption campaign, the allocation of capital and labor becomes more efficient in ex ante highly corrupt industries. Firms in these industries experience productivity gains, easier access to debt financing, and higher growth of sales than firms in other industries. Overall, our results suggest that corruption creates negative externalities.
廖冠民，中国人民大学商学院会计学教授。2007年获中国人民大学会计学博士学位，2007—2018年任职于中央财经大学会计学院。主要研究兴趣为公司治理、会计信息在激励合约中的有用性，学术成果发表于Journal of Finance、Journal of Money, Credit and Banking、会计研究、审计研究等国内外学术期刊。