主 题：The Effect of CDS Trading Initiation on Dividend Payout Policy
This study examines whether the initiation of credit default swaps trading affects firm dividend policies. Reduced monitoring by banks following CDS initiation increases the potential for wealth expropriation from equityholders to managers, leading to overinvestment arising from the firm having excess free cash flow. Using a difference-in-difference research design, we predict and find evidence consistent with firms mitigating the increased agency problem following CDS initiation by increasing dividend payout to equityholders. Consistent with the agency explanation for the increase in dividends following CDS initiation, we also find evidence that the increase in dividends is larger for firms with larger free cash flow, and for firms whose lead arranger banks have relatively less strong reputations in the loan syndication market. We also find evidence that dividend increases are larger for firms with more liquid CDS markets. Inferences regarding the increase in dividends are unchanged using matched sample and instrumental variable approaches. In addition, we find no evidence of a predetermined trend in dividends before CDS trading initiation.
李超，墨尔本大学会计学博士，现就职于新南威尔士大学商学院会计系。研究兴趣包含证券市场管制，会计盈余持续性，分析师信息生产等资本会计市场问题。论文发表于Journal of Accounting and Public Policy。曾为Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Accounting and Finance, Abacus等期刊匿名审稿。现担任Accounting and Finance 的编委 (Editorial board)。