主 题：Labor Market Immobility and Incentive Contract Design
This paper studies the effects of heightened labor market immobility on executive incentive contract design. We exploit the staggered adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by U.S. state courts as an exogenous negative shock to top executives’ labor market mobility. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find that adoption of the IDD causes a firm to increase the convexity of option holdings by its managers. We also find that for new option grants made after adoption of the IDD, treated firms are more likely to use progressive performance vesting—a vesting condition that helps remove options that have lost risk-taking incentives after becoming deep in-the-money. We also find that adoption of the IDD leads to new option grants with long-term vesting schedules. Our results are consistent with reduced managers’ incentives to choosing risky but valuable long-term investment when they expect increased labor market mobility hurdles. In response, firms adjust compensation-based incentives in an optimal contracting manner. Overall, this study provides causal evidence that labor markets affect incentive contract design.
杨楠,香港理工大学金融学助理教授.在此之前,他于2015年在德克萨斯A&M大学获得金融学博士学位,2008年在纽约州立大学石溪分校获得经济学硕士学位,2006年中国人民大学经济学学士.他的研究方向是公司金融，具体集中在公司高管薪酬激励机制,银行及其他金融机构,以及公司信用风险.他的论文发表在Journal of Financial Economics.