主 题：The Costs of Foreign Takeover Protection: Evidence from Firm Innovation
This study examines the influence of foreign takeover protection on firm innovation activities. We argue that top executives will refrain from research and development (R&D) when firms are protected from foreign takeovers. This is because foreign takeover protection can render the market for corporate control ineffective and attenuate foreign-based product market competition. In addition, the negative influence of foreign takeover protection on R&D intensity is particularly strong for firms from industries with intensive foreign takeover activities as well as for firms with low international diversification. An increase in foreign takeover protection is detrimental not only to innovation efforts in terms of R&D intensity but also to innovation efficiency in terms of new product introductions relative to R&D expenditure. Using the enactment of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA) as a quasi-natural experiment, we find support for our arguments. This study contributes to strategy research by highlighting the governance role of foreign takeovers in shaping firm innovation decisions.
师伟现任迈阿密大学商学院管理系副教授。师伟教授本科毕业于北京外国语大学，之后在美国杜兰大学获得工商管理硕士学位，2016年于美国莱斯大学获得管理学博士学位。他的主要研究领域为公司治理、高管团队和公司战略。他的研究成果已经发表在Academy of Management Journal，Strategic Management Journal，Journal of Management，Journal of Corporate Finance, Global Strategy Journal，Human Resource Management和 Academy of Management Perspectives。