【本期主题】Job Security and Earnings Management（工作保障和盈余管理）
CEO dismissal risk may have disciplinary or opportunistic effect on earnings management. The disciplinary effect incentivizes CEOs to undertake actions to improve real performance, which reduces the need for earnings management, especially for the need of overstating firm performance, while CEOs with opportunistic motives may choose to exaggerate earnings information. With a large sample, we show that, on average, the disciplinary effect dominates. That is, an increase of CEO dismissal hazard is associated with smaller earnings-inflating accruals and less real earnings management. The opportunistic effect is still possible but exists only when dismissal risk is very high. Our evidence suggests that the threat of forced turnover is an effective governance measure that motivates CEOs to undertake rightful actions.
李荻博士，北京大学汇丰商学院助理教授。2012年获美国密歇根大学Ross商学院金融学博士学位。曾经任教于佐治亚州立大学Robinson商学院。从事的研究领域及方向为公司金融，公司治理，和公司并购。曾在Journal of Financial Economics，Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis，Management Science等顶级金融经济期刊上发表过论文。